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We present evidence from laboratory experiments showing that individuals are \last-
place averse." Participants choose gambles with the potential to move them out of
last place that they reject when randomly placed in other parts of the distribution. In
modied-dictator games, participants randomly placed in second-to-last place are the
most likely to give money to the person one rank above them instead of the person
one rank below. Last-place aversion suggests that low-income individuals might oppose
redistribution because it could dierentially help the group just beneath them. Using
survey data, we show that individuals making just above the minimum wage are the
most likely to oppose its increase. Similarly, in the General Social Survey, those above
poverty but below median-income support redistribution signicantly less than their
background characteristics would predict.
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A large literature in economics argues that utility is related not only to absolute consump-
tion or wealth but also to an individual's relative position along these dimensions within a
given reference group.1 This literature has shown that both ordinal and cardinal comparisons
aect utility, but has devoted less attention to the shape of these eects over the distribu-
tion. This paper reports results from laboratory experiments designed to test whether ordinal
rank matters dierently to individuals depending on their position in the distribution. We
hypothesize that individuals exhibit a particular aversion to being in last place, such that a
potential drop in rank creates the greatest disutility for those already near the bottom of
the distribution.
Our second objective is to explore how \last-place aversion" predicts individuals' re-
distributive preferences outside the laboratory. Many scholars have asked why low-income
individuals often oppose redistributive policies that would seem to be in their economic in-
terest. Last-place aversion suggests that low-income individuals might oppose redistribution
because they fear it might dierentially help a \last-place" group to whom they can cur-
rently feel superior. We present supporting evidence for this idea from survey data, though
identifying last-place aversion outside the laboratory is admittedly more challenging as it is
relatively harder to determine where individuals see themselves in the income distribution.
We begin with the more straightforward task of identifying last-place aversion (LPA) in
laboratory experiments. The two sets of experiments explore LPA in very dierent contexts.
In the rst set of experiments, participants are randomly given unique dollar amounts and
then shown the resulting \wealth" distribution. Each player is then given the choice between
receiving a payment with probability one and playing a two-outcome lottery of equivalent
expected value, where the \winning" outcome allows the possibility of moving up in rank.
We nd that the probability of choosing the lottery is uniform across the distribution except
for the last-place player, who chooses the lottery signicantly more often.
In the second set of experiments, participants play modied-dictator games. Individuals
are randomly assigned a unique dollar amount, with each player separated by a single dollar,
and then shown the resulting distribution. They are then given an additional $2, which they
must give to either the person directly above or below them in the distribution. Giving
the $2 to the person below means that the individual herself will fall in rank, as ranks are
separated by $1. Nonetheless, players almost always choose to give the money to the person
below them, consistent with Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and other work on inequality aversion.
However, the subject in second-to-last-place gives the money to the person above her between
1This work largely began with Duesenberry (1949). We review the literature more thoroughly later in the
Introduction.
2one-half and one-fourth of the time, consistent with LPA's prediction that concern about
relative status will be greatest for individuals who are at risk of falling into last place.
In our data it is sometimes dicult to distinguish between strict last-place aversion
and a more general low-rank aversion|in some experiments, individuals seem modestly
averse to second-to-last place as well as last place. However, we can always separate last-
place or low-rank aversion from a desire to be above the median, the inequality-aversion
model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999), the equity-reciprocity-competition model of Bolton and
Ockenfels (2000), the distributional preference model of Charness and Rabin (2002), total-
surplus maximization, and, generally, a linear eect of initial rank.
While supportive of LPA, the laboratory evidence alone is limited as it can only speak
to whether the phenomenon exists in game-like settings. We thus turn to survey data to
examine whether patterns of support for actual redistributive policies are consistent with
LPA. Of course, in the \real world," the concept of \last-place" is far less well-dened than
in the two experimental environments described above. To a rst approximation, no one is
literally in last place in the U.S. income or wealth distribution. Strictly speaking, LPA cannot
explain why, for example, politicians might be able to divide low-income voters and prevent
them from uniting in support of redistributive taxes and transfers, as such policies will not
land anyone literally in last place. If, instead, individuals create reference groups specic to
whatever policy question they are considering, then LPA has more hope of explaining policy
preferences.
We begin with the minimum wage. LPA predicts that those making just above the current
minimum wage might actually oppose an increase|though they might see a small increase in
their own wage, they would now have the \last-place" wage themselves and would no longer
have a group of worse-o workers from whom they could readily distinguish themselves. We
could not nd existing survey data that includes both respondents' actual wages (as opposed
to family income) and their opinion regarding minimum wage increases, so we conducted our
own survey of low-wage workers. Consistent with almost all past surveys on the minimum
wage, support for an increase is generally over 80 percent. However, consistent with LPA,
support for an increase among those making between $7.26 and $8.25 (that is, within a dollar
greater than the current minimum wage of $7.25 and thus those most likely to \drop" into
last place) is signicantly lower.
Finally, we use nationally representative survey data to examine whether more general
redistributive preferences appear consistent with LPA. In particular, do those who are above
poverty but below median-income|roughly speaking, the analogue to the \second-to-last-
place" subjects in our redistribution experiment|exhibit softer support for redistribution
than their background characteristics would otherwise suggest? While hardly a denitive
3test of LPA, we would be concerned if individuals relatively close to the bottom of the
distribution were highly supportive of redistribution. In fact, in General Social Survey data,
the pattern predicted by LPA holds across a variety of survey questions and subgroups of
the population.
Our paper contributes to the literature on distributional preferences, which many past
authors have explored using, as we do, modied dictator games. As most of these experiments
involve just two (or at most three) players, they can oer only a very limited view of the
shape of distributional preferences as a function of relative position.2 Moreover, as we discuss,
many of these models (e.g., those that posit individuals wish to improve the position of the
worst-o person) have predictions in the opposite direction of LPA. In general, we show that
many of the predictions of these models tend to break down for individuals near the bottom
of the distribution.
In contrast to the experimental approach, other papers have used survey data to examine
how subjective well-being varies with one's position in the income distribution, though they
have not tested our specic non-linear formulation. Boyce, Brown and Moore (2010) use
British data to show that percentile in the income distribution predicts life satisfaction better
than either absolute income or relative income (absolute income divided by some reference
income level, usually the mean or median). Clark, Westerg ard-Nielsen and Kristensen (2009)
are able to focus on small Danish neighborhoods and nd that income rank within locality
is a better predictor of economic satisfaction than absolute income.
Instead of examining strictly ordinal measures like rank or percentile, most papers in this
literature have instead focused on relative income, likely because it requires knowing only the
mean or median (as opposed to the entire distribution) of the comparison group's income.
Luttmer (2005) and Blanchower and Oswald (2004) nd that holding own income constant,
increasing the income of those living near you has a negative eect on reported well-being;
Hamermesh (1975) provides an early example of a similar eect regarding relative wages and
job satisfaction and Card et al. (2012) use an experiment in which only some employees are
encouraged to learn their relative wage to demonstrate the same result. There is no consensus
on whether there is a non-linear eect of relative income|Card et al. nd that those below
the median care more about relative income, Blanchower and Oswald nd some evidence
in the opposite direction, and Luttmer nds those below and above the median are aected
equally by relative income.
2As Engelmann and Strobel (2007) note in their review of distribution games: \Taking note of the limited
ability of two-player dictator games to discriminate between dierent distributional motives....it is surprising
that there is a relative sparsity of dictator experiments with more than two players." A recent addition to the
literature is Durante, Putterman and van der Weele (forthcoming), who conduct twenty-player distribution
experiments, though in most of their sessions players do not know their place in the distribution.
4Other papers have focused on why individuals care about relative position. Cole, Mailath
and Postlewaite (1992) argue that even if individuals do not care about relative position per se
(i.e., it does not enter directly into their utility function) because many real outcomes (such
as marriage quality) depend on relative as opposed to absolute position, relative position
will appear in reduced-form utility expressions. Also focusing on relative competition, Eaton
and Eswaran (2003) develop a model where natural selection favors those who care about
relative position, as relative position determines access to food sources and high-quality
partners. Indeed, Raleigh et al. (1984) oer empirical evidence that concern about rank is
\hard-wired"|they nd that when a dominant (subordinate) vervet monkey is placed in
a group where he is now subordinate (dominant), his serotonin level drops (rises) by 40-50
percent.3
By the logic developed in the above evolutionary models, not only would humans care
about relative position in general but a strong aversion to being near last place would arise
because in a monogamous society with roughly balanced sex-ratios, only those at the very
bottom would not marry or reproduce. Indeed, being \picked last in gym class" is so often
described as a child's worst fear that the expression has become a clich e.
While few papers have linked social comparison to support for redistributive policies,
there is a large literature on how individuals form redistributive preferences. Many papers
have examined how demographic and background characteristics determine support for re-
distribution.4 Other papers have focused, as we do, on explanations for why low-income
voters do not support higher levels of redistribution, focusing on mobility (Benabou and Ok
2001), imperfect information (Bredemeier 2010), and the role of competing, non-economic
issues that divide low-income voters (Roemer 1998). In the U.S. context, race has often been
examined as one such issue (Lee and Roemer 2006). In our analysis of the General Social
Survey, we thus take care to show that redistributive-preference patterns consistent with
last-place aversion hold for both whites and minorities, and thus cannot be explained merely
by whites' views of low-income minorities.
While we focus on redistributive preferences and risk-taking, researchers have examined
other potential consequences of social comparison. For example, Veblen (1899) argued that
concern for relative position inspires conspicuous consumption, an idea formalized by Frank
(1985) and others, and explored empirically by Charles, Hurst and Roussanov (2009).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses how LPA can
be separately identied from other models of preferences and social comparison. Sections III
and IV presents results from, respectively, the lottery experiment and the modied-dictator
3See Zizzo (2002) for a review of the neurobiology of relative position.
4See, e.g., Alesina and Giuliano (2011) and citations therein.
5experiment. Sections V and VI include the results from our minimum wage survey and the
General Social Survey analysis, respectively. Section VII discusses the potential implications
of last-place aversion for behaviors beyond those we investigate in this paper and oers
recommendations for future work.
II. SEPARATING LAST-PLACE AVERSION FROM OTHER MODELS OF
PREFERENCES
Consider a nite number of individuals with distinct wealth levels y1 < y2 < ::: < yN, so
y1 is the wealth of the poorest (\last-place") person. We follow previous research and assume
that utility is additively separable in absolute wealth and relative position.5 We write the
utility of person i as:
u(yi;ri) = g(ri) + (1   )f(); (1)
where ri is relative position, so ri = 1 for the last-place person, up to ri = N for the rst-place
person. Let  2 (0;1). For the moment, we set aside f() and focus on g(r).
Strictly speaking, last-place aversion assumes that g(ri) = 1(ri > 1)  1(yi > y1), where
1 is an indicator function. Essentially, g(ri) is a bonus payment to all but the last-place
individual. We plot this function for the six-person distribution y1 = $1;y2 = $2;:::;y6 = $6
(which will be used in some of our experiments) in Figure I.
If, instead, one assumes that individuals have a special dislike for being low-rank, not
just last-place, then g(ri) would not be a step function but a positive, concave function
where utility increases steeply at the bottom of the distribution but then quickly attens
out. This shape also arises if g(ri) = 1(ri > 1)  1(yi > y1) but yi is subject to random
perturbations i . The second series of Figure I plots the probability that yi+i (  N(0;1))
is above last place in the ex-post distribution, by the original rank in the ex-ante fy1;y2;::::y6g
distribution. There is substantial disutility faced not only by the last-place player but also
the second-to-last: he faces the non-trivial probability of falling into last place given the
income uncertainty, whereas this risk is essentially zero for the individuals above him.
We take an agnostic view of how to specify f() and instead focus on empirically sepa-
rating LPA from a large class of f() functions posed in the existing literature, so f can take
a variety of arguments, such as absolute and relative levels of income as well as functions
of ordinal rank besides LPA. LPA suggests that the predictions from many of these models
will break down for individuals near the bottom of the distribution.
For example, as we discuss in the next section, standard formulations of expected utility
5See, e.g., Charness and Rabin (2002), but also many others.
6theory, that is, f() = f(yi), predicts that individuals will only choose a lottery over a risk-
free payment of equal expected value if they are risk-seeking. Given that risk-aversion is
believed to decrease in wealth (and that this prediction holds over small-stakes in laboratory
settings), it further predicts that the last-place player would be the least likely to choose the
lottery. As we show in the next section, LPA predicts that last-place individuals will be the
most likely to choose the lottery, as long as it oers them the chance to move up in rank.
Similarly, we show in Section IV that LPA can be separately identied from many
distributional preference models. For example, in their model of inequality aversion, Fehr
and Schmidt (1999) posit that f()  f(y1;y2;::::yi;::::yN) = yi   
P
j6=i maxfxj xi;0g
n 1  

P
j6=i maxfxi xj;0g
n 1 ; where  >  > 0: This model predicts that if a person is given a choice
between giving money between a person above him in the distribution or a person below
him, he will always choose the person below him. LPA suggests that this prediction will
break down for individuals just above last place, as giving to the person below moves them
closer to last place themselves.
In the sections that follow, we empirically separate the predictions of LPA from these
and other models posited by the existing literature.
III. EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE OF LAST-PLACE AVERSION: MAKING RISKY
CHOICES
We begin our test of last-place aversion by examining whether individuals choose to
bear risk in return for the possibility of moving out of last place. Note that we made an
eort to design these experiments as well as those in Section IV so as not to unduly trigger
LPA. As we speculate that shame or embarrassment may motivate individuals' desire to
avoid last place, participants never interact face-to-face, but instead through computers,
and they generate their own screen names and are thus free to protect their identity if they
wish.6 We seated everyone walking into the lab sequentially into dierent rows, so those who
entered together and presumably might know each other were not in the same group and
thus individuals did not play against their friends. Each individual sits in a separate carrel
surrounded by large blinders, which further enhance privacy and anonymity. Players are not
publicly paid and instead money is discreetly given to them while they are still sitting in
their carrels.7 Finally, all of the experiments involve an initial assignment to a rank, and we
6For condentiality reasons, the data extract that we receive from the lab does not include respondents'
actual names, so we cannot examine how many chose \fake" screen names. But just under twenty percent use
screen names that are obviously not real names (e.g., \turtle," \panda," \Big Papi"). Moreover, in almost
no cases did people use screen names that looked like a rst and a last name, so subjects would be unable
to look up their opponents on, say, Facebook or Google after the experiment.
7While privacy likely diminishes LPA it is unlikely to eliminate it|the literature discussed in the In-
troduction suggests that concern for rank may be \hard-wired" and in fact eld work suggests that eort
7make clear to participants that this assignment is performed randomly by a computer. We
believe the emphasis on random assignment should diminish LPA by discouraging players
from associating rank and merit.
Despite the above steps, it is also a fair critique that in attempting to make the experiment
engaging, we may have put participants in the mind-set of playing a game (readers can judge
for themselves by examining the screenshots in the Online Appendix). Finishing in rst or
last place may well be especially salient in games, and as such this design may unfairly
trigger LPA. On the other hand, as the screenshots show, when we display ranks, we always
describe the last-place player as being in Nth place in a N-player game, never in last place.
Moreover, in the \real world" one's economic status is neither private nor explicitly random,
suggesting our experimental design may in anything diminish status concerns relative to
those experienced outside the lab.
III.A. Data and experimental design, main experiment
Participants (N = 84) sign up by registering online at the Harvard Business School Com-
puter Lab for Experimental Research (CLER). See Online Appendix Table 1 for demographic
summary statistics as well as more detailed information on eligibility requirements for regis-
tration and payment of participants. We randomly divide participants into fourteen groups of
six, with groups being xed across all rounds. Each round begins with the computer randomly
assigning each player a place in the distribution f$1:75;$2:00;$2:25;$2:50;$2:75;$3:00g.
Ranks and actual dollar amounts of all players are common knowledge and clearly displayed
throughout the game. The computer then presents an identical two-option choice set to all
players in the game:
In this round, which would you prefer?
(i) Win $0.13 with 100 percent probability.
(ii) Win $0.50 with 75 percent probability and lose $1.00 with 25 percent probability.
After players have submitted their choices, the computer makes independent draws from
the common P(win) = 3=4 probability distribution for each player who chooses the lottery
and adds the risk-free amount to the balance of each player who did not choose the lottery.
The new balances and ranks are then displayed. The players are then re-randomized to
the same f$1:75;::::;$3:00g distribution and the game repeats. Each session consists of nine
rounds, but participants are not told how many rounds the game entails to avoid end eects.8
changes when individuals learn their rank privately (see, e.g., Tran and Zeckhauser 2012).
8See Rapoport and Dale (1966) for an early treatment of so-called \end eects."
8Participants are told that one randomly selected player from the session will be paid his
balance from one randomly selected round.
Note that the payment players can receive with probability one is always equal to half
the dierence between ranks, rounded up to the nearest penny. That is, $0.125 ($0:252 =
$0:125), rounded up to $0.13. The \winning" payment of the lottery is always equal to the
dierence between a given individual and the person two ranks above him, that is, $.50. And
the losing outcome of the lottery is set to $1, so that the lottery and the risk-free options are
equal in expected value after rounding (0:750:50 0:251 = 0:125  0:13), and for ease of
exposition we will describe the two options as having equal expected value. Note that even
if the last-place player chooses the lottery and loses, he will still have $0.75, so can never
\owe" money.
III.B. Predictions
What does existing literature suggest about laboratory participants' tendencies to choose
the lottery over the risk-free option? All research that we found assessing risk-aversion in
the lab explores settings without social comparison (e.g., individuals do not interact with
others and only know their own experimental income levels). First, in contrast to strict risk-
aversion, existing work suggests that between one-fourth and one-half of subjects appear
risk-seeking or risk-neutral in laboratory experiments.9 Second, past work suggests that any
such risk-taking should increase with initial wealth levels. That is, in the laboratory subjects
display diminishing absolute risk aversion.10
Last-place aversion oers predictions that are in sharp contrast to diminishing absolute
risk aversion. As we show below, the exact predictions depend slightly on players' levels of
strategic sophistication|because players make their choices simultaneously, more strategi-
cally minded players would condition their choice on what they think others will do. However,
under all sophistication assumptions, we predict that those in the bottom of the distribution
will choose the lottery more often than those at the top.
First, assume that, as a heuristic, players hold others' balances constant when they make
their decisions.11 Last-place aversion then predicts that the last-place player will choose the
9Holt and Laury (2002) nd that subjects choose the riskier of two options about one-third of the time.
Harrison, List and Towe (2007) use a similar procedure and nd that 56 percent in fact choose the riskier
lottery. Dohmen et al. (2005) nd that roughly 22 percent are risk-neutral or risk-loving, even in situations
with relatively large stakes. In perhaps the application closest to ours, in that subjects choose between
lotteries and risk-free payments of equal expected value, Harbaugh, Krause and Vesterlund (2002) nd that
46 percent of adult laboratory subjects choose the lottery. Note that we do not cite evidence on risk-aversion
outside the laboratory, given the critique that the risk-aversion displayed over small-stakes in laboratory
settings is perhaps a separate phenomenon from that displayed in the \real-world" (Rabin 2000).
10See Levy (1994), Holt and Laury (2002) and Heinemann (2008), among many others.
11See, e.g., Moore, Oesch and Zietsma (2007), and Radzevick and Moore (2008), who nd that subjects
ignore their opponents' decisions even in situations where those decisions should be highly salient.
9lottery more often than will other players. We relegate the algebra to the Online Appendix,
but the intuition is simple: only for the last-place player does the lottery oer a chance to
move out of last-place, and thus even some risk-averse subjects will nd that this possibility
outweighs the utility cost of bearing additional risk.
Second, assume that instead of holding others' balances constant, individuals assume
that their fellow subjects choose randomly between the lottery and risk-free option (that is,
they assume their fellow players are level-0 reasoners, meaning they themselves are level-1
reasoners, to borrow the terminology in Stahl and Wilson 1995).12 To predict decisions under
this set of assumptions, for each player, we simulate the resulting distribution when (1) he
chooses the risk-free option, versus (2) he chooses the lottery, where in both cases his fellow
subjects play randomly. As Online Appendix Figure 1 shows, the probability of escaping last
place is maximized for the last-place player when he chooses the lottery, but for all other
players the probability of avoiding last place is maximized by taking the risk-free option.
As such, LPA again predicts that the last-place player will be the most likely to choose the
lottery.
Finally, players may assume their opponents play strategically and thus solve for the
Nash equilibrium. In Online Appendix D, we show that under LPA, the incentive to gain
the 1(yi > y1) term of the utility function has the last- and second-to-last place players
playing a mixed strategy between the lottery and risk-free option, with no one else choosing
the lottery. Assuming again that there is some baseline level of risk-seeking subjects in our
laboratory settings, LPA under this scenario predicts that the last- and second-to-last-place
subjects will choose the lottery at a greater tendency than other subjects.
Subjects' strategic sophistication is dicult to predict a priori. Much work has found
that subjects display level-1 sophistication, suggesting we would see elevated risk-taking for
the last-place player but not the second-to-last.13 Moreover, it has been shown that subjects
are less likely to converge to Nash play when the Nash equilibrium is in mixed strategies.14
Either way, the prediction from LPA contrasts to that of the standard model and thus the
experiment provides a demanding test of our theory.
III.C. Results
Figure II shows the probability individuals choose to play the lottery, as a function of
their rank at the time they make the decision. Its most striking feature is the relatively at
12A level-0 reasoner makes decisions randomly. In the Stahl and Wilson (1995) terminology, a level-k
reasoner assumes that his opponents are drawn from a distribution of level-0 through level-k-1 reasoners.
As such, a level-1 reasoner assumes that his opponents play randomly.
13See, e.g., Nagel (1995) and Costa-Gomes and Weizs acker (2008), in which most players appear to be
level-1 and Camerer, Ho and Chong (2004), where players appear to be level-1.5.
14See Ochs (1995).
10relationship between rank and the propensity to choose the lottery for ranks one through
ve, contrasted with the elevated propensity for players in last place. Not only, as the regres-
sion analysis will show, is the last-place player signicantly more likely than other players
to choose the lottery, the p-values noted on the gure show that the pair-wise dierence be-
tween the last-place player and each of the other individual ranks are generally statistically
signicant (with the one exception having a p-value of 0.128). Online Appendix Figure 2
shows that the elevated tendency of the last-place subject to choose the lottery holds after
excluding the rst two rounds, which previous research has shown are noisier as players are
still learning.15
While the last-place player plays the lottery most often, other players do not completely
eschew it. This nding is consistent with the literature cited earlier on risk-seeking behavior
in laboratory settings, though the rates of risk-seeking for ranks one through ve appear
somewhat higher in our experiment. There is no evidence that the fth-place player is \de-
fending" his position against the heightened tendency of the last-place player to gamble, as
in the Nash outcome. Note also that there is no evidence of a \rst-place" eect|those in
rst and second place do not appear to compete against each other by going for the higher
potential payo. If LPA were purely being driven by the game-like setting of the experiment,
one might also expect a competitive eect at the top of the distribution, given the salience
of \rst place" in games.
Table I displays results from probit regressions, reported as changes in probability. Col.
(1) includes dummies for fth and sixth place as well as round and group xed eects. The
results suggest that last-place players play the lottery 13.4 percentage points (or 23 percent,
given a mean rate of playing the lottery of 0.591) more than players in ranks one through
four, and there is no dierential eect for the fth-place player. For the rest of the table we
pool the fth-place player with ranks one through four to gain power. Cols. (2) and (3) show
that the last-place eect is robust to excluding the rst two rounds.
Prospect theory suggests that individuals are risk-loving over losses when they are below
their reference point. Two of the most commonly posited references points are the group
mean or median (which in our case are equivalent) and one's previous outcome.16 Cols. (4)
and (5) show results when, respectively, we add controls for being below the median (in
which case LPA is identied by comparing last place to fourth and fth place) or below
one's previous outcome. In both cases these controls have the expected, positive sign, but
their inclusion does not aect the coecient on the last-place term.
15See Carlsson (2010) for a discussion and review of literature on why preferences may be more stable as
subjects gain experience.
16See Clark, Frijters and Shields (2008) for a review of the literature on how individuals form reference
points.
11A potential confound in the experiment is that those at the bottom (top) of the dis-
tribution have only limited ability to fall (rise) in rank, which might increase (decrease)
their incentive to gamble. In col. (6) we thus control for each players' expected change in
rank from choosing the lottery over the risk-free payment.17 The coecient on this term has
the expected, positive sign, but the coecient on the last-place term remains positive and
signicant.
While inequality-aversion has not often been applied to decisions over risk, we explore this
possibility in col. (7). We calculate the expected value of the two Fehr-Schmidt terms under
two scenarios: (1) player i plays the lottery and all other players' balances are held constant;
(2) player i takes the safe option, and all other players' balances are held constant.18 For
each player, we take the dierence in disadvantageous (advantageous) inequality under these
two scenarios as a proxy for the net eect of his decision on disadvantageous (advantageous)
inequality. The results in col. (7) suggest that adding these controls increases the propensity
of the last-place player to play the lottery.
In col. (8) we evaluate LPA versus a model where the eect of rank is linear. Adding a
linear rank control (for ease of interpretation, we scale it so that rst-place is coded as zero
and last-place is coded as one) has only a marginal eect on the last-place dummy (it falls
by less than one-fourth from its value in col. 2) though the p-value is now 0.108 as standard
errors have increased. The coecient on linear rank is small|moving from rst to last place
increases the propensity to choose the lottery by only 0.05 percentage points, whereas the
last-place eect by itself is equal to 0.104 percentage points.
Online Appendix Table 3 shows that the main results in col. (2) of Table I are robust
to adding background and demographic controls. The only signicant dierential LPA eect
we nd is that men are more likely than women to choose the lottery when in last place. The
table also shows that the results barely change when individual xed eects are included.
We tend not to emphasize these results, as with only nine rounds there is still considerable
between-player variation in the randomly assigned ranks that is useful to exploit.
III.D. Last-place aversion when balances accumulate
It is possible that re-randomizing ranks each round increases the propensity of low-rank
players to choose the lottery, as the consequences are limited to the given round and there is
no risk of accumulating large losses. In an additional experiment, we let balances accumulate
17For example, for rank = 2, winning $0.50 would increase his rank by one, whereas losing $1 would
decrease his rank by four, so the expected change in rank from playing the lottery is 0:751 0:254 =  0:25.
By construction, choosing the risk-free payment does not change his rank. As such, the expected change in
rank from playing the lottery relative to taking the risk-free payment,  Exp. rank, is  0:25   0 =  0:25:
18In Online Appendix Table 2 we show that results are robust if instead we do these calculations assuming
that player i chooses the lottery and wins or that player i chooses the lottery and loses.
12between rounds to test the robustness of the LPA eect.19
The \risk-free" and \lottery" options of the rst round of this experiment are equivalent to
that of the original experiment. However, unlike the rst experiment, players' balances evolve
after the rst round and thus we modify the values of the \risk-free" and \lottery" options
accordingly. The risk-free payment is always equal to half the dierence between the current
balance of the last- and fth-place players. The \winning" payment of the lottery is always
equal to the dierence between the last- and fourth-place players. As before, the payos are
designed so that last-place individuals always have the opportunity to accept a gamble that
oers the possibility of moving up in rank, holding all other players' balances constant; this
condition holds 92 percent of the time for ranks two through ve as well. Because balances
accumulate, players who lose successive lotteries can have negative balances.20 The notes to
Online Appendix Table 4 oer further detail.
This version of the game has the drawback that incentives are more dicult to model in
a dynamic setting than in a one-shot game: as players are paid based on a randomly chosen
round, they should in principle weigh both the immediate eect of their decision (equivalent
to the one-shot game) as well as the eects on later rounds. However, given the evidence
suggesting that subjects tend to maximize current-round payos even in multi-round games
where the actual payo is explicitly based on the nal balance, it is likely that subjects
will generally think of their decisions as in one-shot games.21 Despite this ambiguity, this
experimental design has the important benet that accumulating balances better reects the
\real world," where income and wealth are not re-randomized at the start of each period.
Figure III shows that the heightened tendency of the last-place player to choose the lottery
is not merely an artifact of re-randomization and remains when balances accumulate. In this
case, we nd evidence that the second-to-last-player chooses the lottery at a signicantly
higher rate as well. In fact, he is marginally more likely to choose the lottery than the
last-place player, though this dierence is reduced when we drop the rst two rounds and
disappears when we control for whether losing the lottery would lead to a negative balance.22
Online Appendix Table 4 shows that the heightened tendency of the fth- and sixth-place
players to choose the lottery is robust to the alternative hypotheses we explored in Table I
(in particular, the eect remains highly signicant after a linear rank term is included). A
nice feature of this version of the experiment is that in some rounds, even if he wins the
19This experiment as well as the two described in the next section took place in separate sessions (for a
total of four sessions), so subjects are not contaminated across experiments.
20In this version of the game, we give a $20 bonus payment to the player randomly chosen to receive his
experimental earnings, so that players never owe money.
21See, e.g., Benartzi and Thaler (1995), Gneezy and Potters (1997) and Camerer (2003) among others.
22See Online Appendix Figure 3 and Online Appendix Table 5.
13lottery the last-place player cannot \catch" the fth-place player so long as the fth-place
player takes the risk-free payment. Consistent with LPA, there is no heightened tendency
for lower-rank players to choose the lottery in these rounds.
Given recent work showing that highly salient feedback and xed-partner matching en-
hances strategic play, we suspect that this dynamic form of the game makes fth-place players
move toward the Nash outcome of the stage game.23 Feedback is obviously more salient in
this version of the game, as your current decision aects your future balance. Because ranks
are \stickier" in this version of the game, players are much more likely to have the same per-
son one rank above them two rounds in a row, thus approximating \xed partner" matching
in two-person games.24
The results in this section contrast sharply with previous experimental ndings|which
come from settings without social comparison|showing that subjects exhibit diminishing
absolute risk-aversion in the lab. As already noted, our subjects also exhibit somewhat higher
levels of risk-seeking. Our results thus suggest that both the level of risk-aversion and its
relationship to experimental wealth may depend on whether individuals view wealth in an
absolute or relative sense, an interesting question for future research.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE OF LAST-PLACE AVERSION: PREFERENCES
OVER REDISTRIBUTION
In this section, we test the predictions of last-place aversion in a very dierent context|
individuals' decisions to redistribute experimental earnings among their fellow players. Fol-
lowing previous research, we explore distributional preferences using modied dictator games.
However, unlike previous research, which is generally restricted to experiments with two or
at most three players, we examine a large enough distribution to meaningfully explore non-
linearities in preferences with respect to relative position.
IV.A. Experimental design
As in the lottery experiment, the game begins with players (N = 42, divided into seven
six-player games) being randomly assigned dollar amounts, in this case $1, $2,...,$6. As
before, the ranks and current balances of all players are common knowledge throughout the
game. Each player ranked two through ve must choose between giving the player directly
above or directly below them an additional $2. As players are separated by $1, giving to the
player below results in a drop in rank. Instructions and a typical screen shot from the game
23See Hyndman et al. (2012), Rapoport, Daniel and Seale (2008) and especially Danz, Fehr and K ubler
(2012).
24In the accumulating-balances version of the experiment, the same person is above a given player this
round as in the previous round 56 percent of the time, compared to 15 percent in the re-randomized one-shot
version of the game.
14are found in the Online Appendix. As the choice between the person directly above and
below is not well-dened for the rst- and last-place players, we have the rst-place player
choose between the second- and third-place player, and the last-place player between the
fourth- and fth-place player. The choice sets are summarized in Online Appendix Table 6.
Players are clearly instructed that the additional $2 comes from a separate account and not
from the player herself.
After players make their decisions, one player is randomly chosen and his choice deter-
mines the nal payos of that round. As such, players should make their decisions as if they
alone will determine the nal distribution of the round. To avoid any reciprocity eects,
players do not know which player is chosen or the outcome of the round. After the end of
each round, players are re-randomized across the same $1, $2,...,$6 distribution and the game
repeats. They are paid their nal balances for one randomly chosen round.
IV.B. Separating LPA from alternative models
Inequality aversion as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) predicts that all players give to the
lower-ranked player. In fact, we designed the experiment so that the net eect of giving to the
lower-ranked person with respect to the standard Fehr-Schmidt inequality terms is constant
for ranks one through ve.25 As such, while inequality-aversion makes the prediction that
players should generally give to the lower-ranked player, it predicts that this tendency should
be no dierent for those close to the bottom of the distribution. LPA, by contrast, predicts
that players near the bottom will give to the lower-ranked person less often.
There is strong empirical support for subjects generally favoring a fellow subject with
less money. In the experiments of Engelmann and Strobel (2004), giving to the lower-ranked
player involves substantially lowering total surplus, but subjects do so regardless about half
the time. As Tricomi et al. (2010) show, in both subjective ratings and fMRI data, the poorer
member in a two-player game evaluates transfers to the richer member more negatively than
the richer person evaluates transfers to the poorer person. LPA thus requires that those
at the bottom of the distribution overcome the psychological cost typically associated with
giving money to someone richer.
Because we hold total surplus (the $2 must go to someone) and own income constant,
we are able to separate LPA from several other models of distributional preferences. First,
many papers have posited that utility is a positive function of
yi
 y , but an individual's decision
in our experiment cannot aect either the numerator (she cannot keep the money herself)
or the denominator (total surplus is xed so the average among all players,  y, is also xed).
Similarly, in Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), utility is based on own income and one's share of
25The note under Online Appendix Table 6 shows the simple arithmetic behind this claim.
15total surplus, neither of which is aected by the player's decision to give $2 to the person
above or below. In Charness and Rabin (2002), utility is a weighted sum of own income,
total surplus and the income of the poorest person. Their model in fact predicts that the
last-place player will be the most likely to give to the lower-ranked player, as only he can
improve the minimum-income level of the distribution by giving $2 to the person below him.
By design, giving to the lower-ranked player in their choice set causes all players except
the rst and last to drop one rank in the distribution. We thus predict that rst- and last-
place players will have the highest rates of giving to the lower-ranked player, as they do not
face an equality-rank trade-o. Among those facing such a trade-o (ranks two through ve),
LPA predicts that dropping in rank would have the largest psychic cost for those close to last
place themselves and thus that individuals will be the least likely to give to the lower-ranked
player when they themselves are in second-to-last place. Adding LPA to our knowledge
of individuals' behavior in simpler redistribution experiments, we predict a strong overall
tendency to give to the lower-ranked player, but a substantial reduction in this tendency for
those in the bottom of the distribution, particularly for the person in second-to-last place.
IV.C. Initial results
Our rst version of the redistribution experiment grouped players into groups of six,
to follow the lottery experiments. Figure IV shows how the probability a player gives the
additional $2 to the lower-ranked player in his choice set varies by rank. Overall, players
choose to give to the lower-ranked player in their choice set 75 percent of the time, consistent
with inequality aversion. This probability varies from over eighty percent in the top half of
the distribution, to less than sixty percent for the second-to-last place player. Players are
the least likely to give to the last-place player when they are in second-to-last place and this
dierence is pairwise signicant for the rst-, third- and last-place players, and marginally
signicant (p = 0:120) for the second-place player. Those third-from-last (for whom giving
to the lower-ranked player leads to a demotion to second-to-last) are nearly equally likely
to deny the $2 to the lower-ranked player, though the dierence between the second- and
third-from-last subjects is slightly more pronounced when the rst two rounds are dropped
(Online Appendix Figure 4).
The rst- and last-place players are the most likely to give to the lower-ranked player
in their choice set, consistent with their not facing an equality-rank trade-o. Interestingly,
the last-place player is relatively more likely to give to the higher-ranked player, perhaps
because giving to the second-to-last-place player means he is more isolated in last place.
Table II presents probit regression results reported as changes in probability. In all cases,
round and game xed eects and separate dummy variables for the rst- and last-place
16players are included, since these two players do not have parallel choice sets to those of other
ranks. Col. (1) shows that the second-to-last-place player is signicantly less likely to give
to the lower-ranked player relative to other players, and col. (2) shows that the the same
pattern holds if the second- and third-from-last players are grouped into one category.
A key challenge in separating any LPA eect from competing hypotheses is that with
only six ranks we have limited degrees of freedom. This problem is aggravated in the current
experiment relative to the the lottery experiment because only ranks two through ve have
comparable choice sets, whereas in the lottery game we could compare ranks one through
six. Being able to compare only four ranks makes it impossible to separate, say, a story in
which individuals dislike being near last place versus one in which they want to be above
the median. For this reason, we re-run the experiment with eight players.
IV.D. Results from the eight-player game
Beyond the number of players, the game is exactly parallel to the six-player game de-
scribed in Section IV.A.. Players (N = 72, divided into nine eight-player games) in ranks
two through seven must decide between giving $2 to the person directly above them or below
them, and the rst-place player decides between the second- and third-place players while
the last-place player decides between the sixth- and seventh-place players.
Figure V presents the basic results from the eight-player game. As before, the second-to-
last-place player is the least likely to give to the player below him, and this dierence is often
pair-wise signicant from other ranks. Also as before, the third-to-last-place player appears
similar to the last-place player. Importantly, however, the player just below the median
(rank = 5) shows no such tendency, and the pairwise dierence with the second-to-last-
place player is statistically signicant. Put dierently, comparing the six- and eight-player
games suggests that there is nothing particularly salient about being, say, in fourth or fth
place, but instead behavior appears to depend on how close one is to last place: the fourth-
and fth-place players in the six-player game show strong evidence of LPA, while the fourth-
and fth-place players in the eight-player game do not.
Cols. (3) through (11) of Table II present results from the eight-player game. Consistent
with the gure, in col. (3) the second-to-last-place player is signicantly less likely to give to
the lower-ranked player than are other players (again, the rst- and last-place players always
have their own xed eect, so their generally higher tendency to give to the lower-ranked
player does not contribute to the coecient), and this eect increases when early rounds
are excluded (col. 4). In col (5) we gain precision (the standard error falls by one-fourth) by
including those in third-to-last place as being aected by last-place aversion: if they give $2
to the lower-ranked player, they would fall into second-to-last place.
17Col. (6) explores whether LPA can be instead explained by individuals simply wanting
to be above the median. While the p-value of the second-to-last-place term is not quite
signicant (p = 0:112), it becomes signicant when the rst two rounds are excluded (col.
7) or if we also include the third-to-last-place player to gain precision (col. 8).
Controlling for rank actually increases the coecient on the second-to-last term (col. 9),
though, as with the lottery experiments, the high multi-collinearity between rank and the
variable of interest signicantly increases the standard errors. When we exclude the rst two
rounds (col. 10) or pool the second- and third-from-last players (col. 11), the eect regains its
signicance. In fact, the coecient on rank is \wrong-signed" in all of our tests (higher rank
tends to increase giving to the lower-ranked player, thus cutting in the opposite direction as
LPA) and thus adding it always increases the LPA eects. In cols. (12) to (14) we pool the
six- and eight-player experiments and show that we can separate a linear rank eect from
low-rank aversion more denitively with this larger sample.
Online Appendix Table 7 shows that the results are robust to demographic controls and
presents some dierential treatment eects. Interestingly, self-identied religious and po-
litically conservative people show stronger LPA eects. Such individuals are signicantly
under-sampled in our experiment relative to the general population, suggesting a more rep-
resentative sample might display even larger LPA eects.26
As noted earlier, inequality aversion in the standard two-term Fehr-Shmidt parameteri-
zation cannot explain our results, as the decision to give the $2 to the person above or below
has the same net eect on the their inequality-aversion terms regardless of rank. We thus
experiment with alternative measures of inequality-aversion and social comparison. Whereas
Fehr and Schmidt focus on the total income above and below, individuals may instead focus
on the average income of those above and below them. Or, individuals may try to max-
imize their position within the income range (Brown et al. 2008) or their position in the
range relative to the last-place person,
yi ylast
Range (Rablen 2008). Alternatively, they may wish
to minimize the Gini coecient of the distribution. Online Appendix 8 shows that LPA is
robust to each of these controls, and in addition is robust to controlling for one's rank in the
previous round.
IV.E. Discussion
The results from these experiments oer broad support for the hypothesis that play-
ers experience disutility from being in the bottom of the distribution. This eect can be
26For example, for the GSS question asking respondents to place themselves on a seven-point conservative-
to-liberal scale, the average is 4.11, compared to 5.3 (5.4) in the six- (eight-) player distribution games
(see summary statistics in Online Appendix Table 1). Similarly, 18 percent of people in the GSS describe
themselves as \very religious," compared to four percent of our experimental sample.
18separated from individuals' merely wanting to be above the median as well as inequality
aversion, surplus maximization, and linear controls for rank. This result in fact contradicts
the predictions of maxi-min models.
Both the six- and eight-player games suggest that players take action to avoid falling not
just to the very bottom rank, but to the second-lowest rank as well. Two possible explana-
tions seem likely. First, players may have a similar distaste for being \near" last place in a
distribution as they do for being in last place itself. In both experiments, this heightened
concern over rank appears to diminish once players are safely near the middle of the distribu-
tion. Alternatively, they may care only about avoiding last place, but may have mistakenly
played the game as strategic when, because only one randomly-chosen player's decision is
implemented, it is actually non-strategic. To facilitate data collection, we had players choose
\as if" they were the dictator, but recent work has found that \role-uncertainty" can have
modest eects on players' decisions, even when it should not in principle.27 Especially in
early rounds, when the pattern of choosing between the person above and below you is less
apparent, the third-from-last player may have assumed that everyone else would give money
to the last-place player, and thus (incorrectly) inferred that by allowing the second-to-last-
place player to leapfrog him, he would run the risk of falling to last place himself. In any
case, as we predicted, players appear less willing to sacrice rank when they are already near
the bottom of the distribution.
V. LAST-PLACE AVERSION AND SUPPORT FOR MINIMUM WAGE INCREASES
In choosing a \real-world" policy to test the predictions of last-place aversion, we begin
with the minimum wage. First, the minimum wage denes the \last-place" wage that can
legally be paid in most labor markets, so it allows us to dene \last place" more easily than in
the context of other policies. Second, while the worst-o workers are not always those being
paid the minimum wage (e.g., middle-class teenagers might take minimum-wage jobs during
the summer), previous research has shown that policies that more explicitly target the poor
such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families could have potentially confounding racial
associations (though we will briey examine welfare support in the next section).28
We emphasize upfront that actual policies simply do not have the same power to reject
alternative distributional preferences that our redistribution experiment in the previous sec-
tion does. No policy asks individuals to choose between helping those directly above them or
27As Iriberri and Rey-Biel (2011) note, role uncertainty has been found to encourage \strategic thinking"
in games, consistent with third-from-last-place players thinking they may need to defend against others'
generosity toward the last-place player. Engelmann and Strobel (2007) also nd dierences in dictator games
with and without role uncertainty. We thank Doug Bernheim for alerting us to this possibility.
28See Gilens (1996).
19below them and most policies that respondents would recognize as redistributive generally
involve helping those at the bottom of the distribution. As such, we view the evidence in
this and the following section as testing whether preferences are consistent with LPA, but
are aware that the results cannot eliminate all alternative theories.
V.A. Predicting who would support a minimum wage increase
A minimum wage increase is a transfer to some low-wage workers from|depending on
market characteristics|other low-wage workers who now face greater job rationing, employ-
ers with monopsony power in the labor market, or consumers who now pay higher prices.
Assuming low-wage workers are not concerned with adverse employment eects|a hy-
pothesis we directly test in the empirical work|they should generally exhibit the greatest
support for an increase relative to other workers. First, they themselves might see a raise,
depending on the dierence between their current wage and the proposed new minimum
and the strength of spillover eects to workers just above the proposed new minimum.29
Second, even for those who would not be directly aected, the policy could act as wage
insurance and should increase their reservation wage. Finally, if low-wage workers are rela-
tively substitutable, then those making just above the current minimum should welcome a
minimum-wage increase as employers would then have less opportunity to replace them with
lower-wage workers.
Last-place aversion, in contrast, predicts that individuals making just above the current
minimum would have limited enthusiasm for seeing it increased. The minimum wage essen-
tially denes the \last-place" wage a worker in most labor markets can legally be paid. A
worker making just above the current minimum might see a wage increase from the policy,
but could now herself be \tied" with many other workers for last place.
V.B. Minimum wage survey data
Questions regarding the minimum wage have often appeared in opinion surveys, but to
the best of our knowledge none have also asked respondents to report their own wages (as
opposed to household income). We thus designed our own survey, which was in the eld twice
(November and December of 2010).30 Subjects were randomly selected from a nationwide
pool and invited to complete the online survey in exchange for ve dollars. Enrollment in
the study was limited to employed individuals between the ages of 23 and 64, so as to target
prime-age workers. We also over-sampled low-wage and hourly workers.
The survey stated the current federal minimum wage ($7.25) and then asked respondents
29The strength of spillover eects has been debated in the literature. Lee (1999) found evidence consistent
with large spillovers, whereas Autor, Manning and Smith (2010) more recently found far more modest
spillovers and in fact showed that they could be due entirely to measurement error.
30The survey was administered by C&T Marketing Group, http://www.ctmarketinggroup.com.
20whether it should be increased, decreased or left unchanged. As only two percent wished
it to be decreased, our main outcome variable is an indicator for wanting it increased, as
opposed to decreased or maintained at the current level.
One version of the survey only sampled hourly workers, to whom we asked: \What is
your current hourly wage? If you have more than one job, please enter the wage for your
main job." For the other survey, which sampled both hourly and salaried workers, we follow
the Congressional Budget Oce in their generation of the U.S. wage distribution by asking
respondents to divide their paycheck by their usual hours in a pay period to calculate an
eective hourly wage: \Even if you are not actually paid by the hour, please calculate your
estimated hourly wage. You can do this by dividing your paycheck by how many hours you
typically work in a pay period.)"31 While we did not ask this sample whether they were
hourly workers, given their eective hourly wages the large majority are likely hourly.32
We make the following sampling restrictions in generating our regression sample. First, we
drop the 74 people who completed the survey in less than two minutes (even though we wrote
the survey, it took us more than three minutes to complete). We also drop from this sample
twelve individuals who report being unemployed but somehow slipped through the survey's
lter. We also drop 63 observations with missing or unusable wage data (e.g.,\Depends").
These exclusions leave a regression sample of 489 observations, with a median wage of $13.80.
Online Appendix Table 9 displays summary statistics from the nal regression sample.33
V.C. Results
Figure VI shows how support for increasing the minimum wage varies across wage groups.
We break up the distribution into $1 bins above the current minimum wage of $7.25, given
past work showing that individuals tend to think in $1 increments.34 As in past surveys,
increasing the minimum wage is a popular policy|roughly eighty percent of our sample
appears to support the idea. The striking exception, however, is the relative lack of support
among those making just above the current minimum (between $7.26 and $8.25). They are,
in fact, the group least likely to support it, and the dierence between them and other groups
in the gure is often statistically signicant. With the exception of this group, support for
31See Footnote 1 of the document: http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/
120xx/doc12051/02-16-wagedispersion.pdf.
32We use the 2011 Current Population Survey to calculate that of those adults making an eective wage
of less than $20 per hour (very similar to our Internet sample), 72 percent were hourly employees. Unlike
our survey, the CPS directly asks workers if they are hourly.
33Relative to the 2011 American Community Survey, our survey over-samples women and the college-
educated. In Online Appendix Table 12 we replicate our main results re-weighting observations to match the
ACS along these two dimensions, producing very similar results.
34See Basu (1997) and cites therein.
21increasing the minimum wage appears to decrease roughly linearly with individuals' wages.35
Table III presents probit regression results. Col. (1) includes a dummy for being \just
above" the current minimum wage (i.e., making more than $7.25 but no more than $8.25 an
hour) and a linear wage control. We top-code the linear wage control at the 90th percentile
because of some unrealistically high reported wage levels that we suspect were caused by
missed decimals points.36 Without any other controls, the \just above" coecient is negative
but not signicant, as shown in col. (1). Note that this is a fairly demanding specication
because those just above the minimum wage are being compared to individuals with incomes
far greater than theirs who are likely dierent on many important dimensions|when in col.
(2) we limit the sample to those below the median wage, the eect of being just above the
current minimum becomes signicant, not surprising given the striking pattern in Figure VI.
In col. (3), adding basic demographic controls substantially increases the eect of being
just above the minimum wage. This result is not surprising|the types of workers who
normally support a minimum wage increase (women, minorities, young workers) are over-
represented among those making just above $7.25. Adding controls for Census division, the
state-level minimum wage and an indicator for whether it is above $7.25 marginally increases
the coecient of interest (col. 4). Similarly, controlling in col. (5) for education and marital
status also marginally increases the magnitude of the eect, as does controlling for party
aliation, union status and approval rating of President Obama (col. 6).
An important concern is that our results may be driven by low-wage workers' fear that a
minimum wage increase will cause disemployment. For this reason, we also asked participants:
\Do you worry that if the minimum wage is set too high, it might make employers reduce
hiring and possibly cause you to lose your job?" We control for the answer to this question
in col. (7). Not surprisingly, those who say a minimum wage increase might threaten their
job are far less likely to support an increase, but controlling for this variable does not aect
the coecient on the variable of interest.
While we tend to think that making within $1 of the minimum wage is the most natural
denition of being \just above" the minimum wage, Online Appendix Table 13 shows that
the main result holds if we change the $8.25 maximum value by $.25 in either direction.
Online Appendix Table 14 shows the results are robust to using an ordered probit model
35As noted already, we know of no survey that allows us to examine minimum-wage support by respondent's
own wage, but we did pool recent Pew surveys on the minimum wage to examine support for the minimum
wage by income (see Online Appendix Figure 6). Though the analogy to our Figure VI is inexact given
the diculty in relating household income and own wage, the shape is strikingly similar in that low-income
groups have relatively soft support for increasing the minimum wage.
36For example, we strongly suspect that $1350 per hour is actually $13.50 per hour. Our results are robust
to dropping top-coded observations or logging (uncapped) wage levels (Online Appendix Tables 10 and 11,
respectively).
22across the three choices of decreasing, maintaining or increasing the minimum wage.
While inequality aversion would predict that everyone would support a minimum wage
increase and thus cannot explain any deviations, just as we did in the redistribution ex-
periment, we explore whether individuals are averse to seeing the average income of those
below them increase.37 In Online Appendix Table 15 we use the CPS to simulate how dif-
ferent minimum-wage increases would aect the average wage of those below each of our
respondents. Controlling for this measure does not appreciably change the main result.
The relatively tepid support among low-income workers for such a transfer is consistent
with last-place aversion, as those who are marginally better o seek to retain their ability
to distinguish themselves from those in \last place." Moving from the laboratory|where
reference groups are xed and highly salient|to the eld|where individuals can be members
of many peer groups|could have diminished LPA. By contrast, the minimum wage results
suggest that the income or wage distribution is salient to individuals in the bottom of the
distribution, resulting in behavior consistent with the behavior observed in the laboratory
experiments.
VI. EVIDENCE OF LPA FROM THE GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY
The minimum wage has the advantage of creating a clear last-place group, but the disad-
vantage of being a relatively narrow policy. Our nal analysis explores general redistributive
preferences as a function of income in the General Social Survey (GSS).
VI.A. Data and empirical framework
The GSS is a repeated cross-sectional survey of around 1,500 respondents per year, con-
ducted every one to two years. The GSS has asked many questions related to redistributive
preferences, but many are only asked for a single year. We follow the literature and focus
on the GSS question that asks individuals to place themselves on the following scale: \Some
people think that the government in Washington should do everything to improve the stan-
dard of living of all poor Americans (they are at point 1 on this card). Other people think
it is not the government's responsibility, and that each person should take care of himself
(they are at point 5)."38 This question is asked most years from 1975 to 2010. We subtract
this variable from six so that it is increasing in support for redistribution.
We use the household income variable in the GSS, and adjust it to 2011 dollars.39 To
37Regarding Fehr-Schmidt-type inequality aversion, for any given worker, an increase in the minimum
wage can only decrease the advantageous inequality below her (which the model assumes is desirable) and
as it cannot conceivably lead to workers leap-frogging over her, should have no eect on disadvantageous
inequality.
38See, e.g., Alesina and Giuliano (2011).
39About ten percent of respondents do not answer the question, far less than in the European Social Survey
23account for the fact that one's taxes and transfers are related to household income adjusted
by household size, we follow recent OECD publications and divide household income by the
square root of the number of household members. For ease of exposition we will refer to this
measure as \income."40
In the redistribution experiments in Section IV, we saw that those in second-to-last place
were hesitant to help those below them. We create a rough GSS analogue to this group:
those with income above the bottom quintile but below the median (i.e., the sixth through
eighth deciles). The analysis below explores whether this group supports redistribution less
than one would otherwise predict from their place in the income distribution.
VI.B. Results
Figure VII shows how support for redistribution varies across income deciles. Not sur-
prisingly, there is a negative eect of income decile on redistributive support. However, the
deviation from trend among those in the seventh and eighth decile is quite striking and in
general yields a negative but convex relationship. For example, the views of individuals in
the seventh decile are as close to those of the rst (richest) decile as they are to the tenth
(poorest). The results are even more pronounced with other proxies of redistributive support.
With respect to increasing the generosity of welfare, Online Appendix Figure 7 shows that
those in the eighth decile have closer views to the richest decile than they do to the poorest.
With respect to voting for the more redistributive party (the Democrats) in presidential
elections, Online Appendix Figure 8 shows those in the seventh decile have substantially
closer preferences to those in the richest decile than they do to those in the poorest decile.
It is important to emphasize that this convex relationship, while consistent with LPA, is
at odds with classic models of redistributive preferences (e.g., Meltzer and Richard 1981). In
these models, individual i gains  y (where  y is the mean of the income distribution and  the
tax rate) in transfers while paying yi in taxes, so support for redistribution is proportional
to  y   yi. Because the distribution of income y tends to to be right-skewed, the empirical
relationship between income decile and support for redistribution would be concave. Online
Appendix Figure 9 graphs  y yi by income decile in the GSS|in sharp contrast to Figure VII,
those in the bottom half of the distribution should have very similar views on redistribution
under the classic formulation.
Table IV presents regression analysis. Col. (1) includes no controls except the LPA dummy
(being in the sixth through eight deciles) and income decile. Income decile has a negative
or World Values Survey, and refusal does not appear related to redistributive preferences. When we regress
our redistribution measure on a dummy for not answering the income question, the point-estimate suggests
that those who do not answer are slightly more supportive of redistribution, but the p-value is 0.460.
40See http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/43540354.pdf.
24eect on support for redistribution, but, as predicted, there is a signicant deviation from
trend for those in the LPA group. In fact, the dierential decrease in support for redistribution
associated with being in the LPA group (-0.0958) is larger than the decrease associated with
moving up an income decile (-0.0870).
This eect is essentially identical when year and region xed eects are added in col. (2).
Col. (3) shows that the result holds when in addition to controlling for income decile, we
also control for actual income. Cols. (4) and (5) show that the deviation of the LPA group is
even more striking (relative to the coecient on income decile) when support for increasing
welfare generosity or voting Democratic serves as the outcome.
An alternative explanation to last-place aversion is that individuals are merely forming
preferences based on self-interest. We explore this possibility by accounting for whether
the respondent was ever on government assistance. Unfortunately, there is limited overlap
(N = 4;066) between our main redistribution outcome and this measure, but the LPA
coecient barely moves when our standard regression is estimated on this sample (col. 6)
and when the assistance control is added (col. 7).41
As noted earlier, a serious concern is that racial attitudes confound these results: in-
dividuals may not be last-place averse but instead simply worry that redistribution will
dierentially help minority groups (who tend to be at the bottom of the distribution), with
whom they feel little kinship. Online Appendix Figures 10 and 11 cast doubt on this alterna-
tive hypothesis: support for redistribution and welfare varies across income deciles in a very
similar manner for minorities as it does for the full sample, though condence intervals widen
because of the smaller sample.42 In Online Appendix Table 17, we show that the regression
coecients barely change when the main specication (col. 2 of Table IV) is estimated with
non-Hispanic whites versus blacks and Hispanics. As Luttmer (2001) has shown, support for
welfare among whites falls when they live near blacks, but in fact that LPA eect among
whites is strongest in the \whitest" regions of the country, further suggesting that racial
resentment is not driving LPA. Finally, we show that whites in the \LPA group" are not
dierentially likely to say that the government is doing \too much" for blacks.
Online Appendix Table 18 provides additional checks, showing that the eect holds for
the prime working-age subsample and after controlling for demographic and background
characteristics, as well as opinions on political and cultural questions.
41There is more substantial overlap with the welfare and voting outcomes. When a parallel exercise is
performed using these outcomes, adding the government assistance variable barely moves the coecients of
interest (see Online Appendix Table 16).
42The relationship between voting Democratic and income decile among minorities does not take the same
shape (see Online Appendix Figure 12), but then almost all minorities vote Democratic and thus there is
little variation in this variable.
25In summary, the GSS results suggest that, once respondents are above the bottom income
quintile, their support for redistribution grows soft. These results do not appear to be driven
by racial resentment or direct self-interest. Respondents below the median but above the
bottom quintile often share opinions about aiding low-income individuals that are similar to
those in the top part of the distribution.
VII. CONCLUSION
We design experiments that allow us to separately identify an aversion to being in the
bottom of a distribution from a large variety of existing models of preferences and social
comparison. Individuals randomly placed in the bottom of a distribution are willing to bear
risk for the possibility of improving in rank that they are unwilling to bear when placed higher
in that distribution. In modied-dictator games, between one-half and one-fourth of second-
to-last-place players give additional money to the person above rather than below them,
whereas such behavior is very rare for individuals in other parts of the distribution. Taken
together, the evidence from these experiments suggest that the predictions from standard
models of preferences may break down toward the bottom of the distribution.
We then apply the insights from the redistribution experiments to predict respondents'
preferences for a particular redistributive policy: increasing the minimum wage. Last-place
aversion predicts that those making just above the current minimum wage face a trade-o:
on the one hand, they may receive a raise if the new minimum wage is above their current
wage; on the other hand, they may lose their status of having a wage above the last-place
group. We conduct a survey and nd that support for a minimum wage increase is lowest
among those making just above the current minimum. Finally, we show that support in the
General Social Survey for redistribution is particularly soft among those who are above the
bottom quintile but below the median income|a rough analogue to those in second-to-last-
place in our redistribution experiments|and in sharp contrast to models where support for
redistribution is proportional to the dierence between own income and average income.
While we have focused largely on redistributive preferences, last-place aversion may have
other applications. Consumer behavior is a natural extension. Past work has noted con-
sumers' tendency to purchase the second cheapest wine on a menu (McFadden 1999), con-
sistent with consumers exhibiting a standard price response but simultaneously avoiding as-
sociation with the \last-place" product. In a choice set of three or four, this same tendency
would lead consumers to pick a \middle" option|the \compromise eect" in behavioral de-
cision theory (Simonson 1989). Similarly, research on the psychology of queuing has shown
that those at the end of a line are the least likely to allow the person behind them to pay to
leapfrog them (Oberholzer-Gee 2006), suggesting psychological disutility from being last in
26line. Interventions targeting the \last place" client might improve the performance of service
operations in both the private and public sectors.
We examined risk-taking and money-transfer decisions, but individuals likely cope with
the disutility of last-place or low-rank in other ways. For example, those in last place might
work especially hard at a given task to move up in rank, they might instead give up, or
they might seek to dene themselves along an alternative metric or within a dierent peer
group. Evidence from the eld is limited, though points in the direction of low-rank leading
to discouragement in educational settings.43 Boys in the Moving to Opportunity experiment
who moved to better neighborhoods and schools, and thus found themselves in the bottom
of the classroom academic distribution, actually exhibited an increase in criminal activity
relative to the control group (Kling, Ludwig and Katz 2005)|consistent with low-rank in a
given domain encouraging individuals to substitute eort to another. Better understanding
how individuals cope with low rank could inform interventions that target disadvantaged
and at-risk individuals.
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31TABLE I
PROBIT REGRESSIONS OF THE PROPENSITY TO CHOOSE THE LOTTERY OVER
THE RISK-FREE PAYMENT
Dept. variable: Chose lottery over risk-free payment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
In last place 0.134 0.135 0.128 0.125 0.110 0.109 0.179 0.104
[0.0533] [0.0518] [0.0619] [0.0564][0.0512][0.0571][0.0914][0.0639]
In fth place -0.00600
[0.0476]
Below median 0.0171
[0.0378]
Below previous round 0.0583
[0.0412]
 Exp. rank 0.0225
[0.0216]
 Disadv. inequality -0.0415
[0.0491]
 Adv. inequality 0.322
[0.237]
Rank, scaled zero to one 0.0528
[0.0648]
Mean, dept. var. 0.591 0.591 0.592 0.591 0.591 0.591 0.591 0.591
Rounds All All Ex. early All All All All All
Log likelihood -475.7 -475.7 -371.6 -475.6 -474.6 -475.1 -474.5 -475.3
Observations 756 756 588 756 756 756 756 756
Notes: All regressions are estimated via probit, coecients are reported as marginal changes in probability,
and standard errors are clustered by individual. The sample is based on 14 six-player games of nine rounds
each. The dependent variable for all regressions is an indicator variable coded as one if the subject chose
the lottery over the risk-free payment. See Section III for further details on the experiment. In specications
that \exclude early" rounds, the rst two rounds are not included. \Below median" is an indicator for
whether the individual was in the bottom half of the distribution at the time of his decision. \Below previous
round" is an indicator for beginning this round with a lower rank than the previous round (it is coded as
zero for the rst round). Exp:Rank is dened as the expected change in rank from playing the lottery
(holding other balances constant). Following Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Disadvantageous inequality is dened
as
P
j6=i maxfxj   xi;0g and Advantageous inequality as
P
j6=i maxfxi   xj;0g. The  for each of these
variables is dened as the expected value when player i plays the lottery minus the value when he takes the
risk-free payment (holding other balances constant). \Rank, scaled zero to one" is an individuals rank at the
time of his decision, scaled so that rst place is zero and last place is one. p < 0:10; p < 0:05; p < 0:01.
32TABLE II
PROBIT REGRESSIONS OF THE PROPENSITY TO GIVE $2 TO THE LOWER-RANKED PLAYER
Dependent variable: Gave money to the lower-ranked player
Six players Eight players Both
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Second from last -0.116* -0.071*-0.097** -0.060 -0.095** -0.072 -0.104* -0.090**
[0.064] [0.040] [0.046] [0.044] [0.048] [0.053] [0.058] [0.035]
Second or third -0.147** -0.068** -0.081* -0.150* -0.097**-0.154**
from last [0.061] [0.030] [0.049] [0.085] [0.030] [0.067]
Below median -0.017 -0.005 0.018
[0.036] [0.042] [0.053]
Rank, scaled zero 0.002 0.016 0.150 0.135
to one [0.088] [0.101] [0.178] [0.139]
Mean, dept. var. 0.747 0.747 0.802 0.784 0.802 0.802 0.784 0.802 0.802 0.784 0.784 0.784 0.784 0.784
Ex. early rds? No No No Yes All All Yes No No Yes Yes No No No
Log l'hood -167.6 -165.5 -306.8 -252.4 -306.2 -306.7 -252.3 -306.2 -306.8 -252.3 -251.6 -478.9 -476.6 -475.9
Observations 336 336 648 504 648 648 504 648 648 504 504 984 984 984
Notes: All regressions are estimated via probit, coecients are reported as marginal changes in probability, round and game xed eects are included,
and standard errors are clustered by individual. The rst two columns are based on seven six-player games of eight rounds each, giving a total of 336
observations, and the next nine columns are based on nine eight-player games of nine rounds each, giving a total of 648 observations, and the nal
three columns pool all observations. The dependent variable is an indicator variable for whether the individual chose to give $2 to the lower ranked
of the two players in his choice set. Specications that \exclude early rounds" drop the rst two rounds. See Section IV for further details on the
experiment. p < 0:10; p < 0:05; p < 0:01.
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3TABLE III
PROBIT REGRESSIONS OF THE PROPENSITY TO SUPPORT A MINIMUM WAGE
INCREASE
Dept. variable: Support min wage increase
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Just above min. wage -0.0921 -0.164 -0.135 -0.149 -0.151 -0.138 -0.142
($7.26 - 8.25) [0.0703] [0.0785] [0.0713] [0.0704] [0.0705] [0.0663] [0.0642]
Hourly wage -0.00217 -0.0337 -0.00114 -0.00270 -0.00161 -0.000241 -0.00209
[0.00183] [0.0141] [0.00189] [0.00190] [0.00214] [0.00204] [0.00203]
Male -0.0687 -0.0558 -0.0680 -0.0541 -0.0496
[0.0402] [0.0400] [0.0406] [0.0390] [0.0379]
Black 0.306 0.310 0.288 0.125 0.136
[0.126] [0.129] [0.132] [0.128] [0.126]
Hispanic -0.105 -0.0902 -0.102 -0.0887 -0.0709
[0.127] [0.128] [0.129] [0.118] [0.111]
Age div. by 100 -0.166 -0.133 -0.0501 0.0574 0.0454
[0.176] [0.176] [0.190] [0.185] [0.181]
Native born 0.0448 0.0782 0.0953 0.0995 0.109
[0.0948] [0.0961] [0.0965] [0.0927] [0.0882]
Min. wage threatens -0.0433
job [0.00947]
Mean, dept. var 0.785 0.787 0.786 0.784 0.784 0.784 0.784
Sample All Low-wage All All All All All
Geogr. controls No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Backgr. controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Polit. controls No No No No No Yes Yes
Log likelihood -253.1 -122.6 -244.1 -233.0 -229.9 -208.8 -199.1
Observations 489 244 486 481 481 481 481
Notes: All data are from the minimum wage survey (see Section V.B. for further detail) and all regressions
are probit regressions (coecients reported as marginal changes in probability) for whether a respondent
answered that the minimum wage should be increased. The wage control is top-coded at $46, the 90th
percentile, because of accuracy concerns for very high wages (see footnote 36). In col. (2), individuals with
wages above the median of $13.80 are excluded. In col. (4), \geographic controls" include xed eects for
the eight Census divisions, the level of the state minimum wage, and an indicator variable for whether the
state minimum is above the federal minimum. In col. (5), \background controls" include marital status, and
indicator variables for no high school, some high school, high school degree, some college, two-year college
degree, four-year college degree, master's degree, doctoral degree, professional degrees. In col. (6), \political
controls" include xed eects for major party aliation; a one-to-seven approval rating of President Obama;
and union status. Col. (7) controls for respondents' answer to the following question: \Do you worry that
if the minimum wage is set too high, it might make employers reduce hiring and possibly cause you to lose
your job?" where one indicates \not at all worried" and seven indicates \very worried." p < 0:10; p <
0:05; p < 0:01.
34TABLE IV
SUPPORT FOR REDISTRIBUTION BY INCOME DECILE
Support redistribution Welfare Vote D. Redistr.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
LPA group (6th -0.0958 -0.0947 -0.0950 -0.0643 -0.0347 -0.119 -0.109
through 8th deciles) [0.0173] [0.0172] [0.0172] [0.00540] [0.00670] [0.0446] [0.0445]
Income decile -0.0870 -0.0896 -0.0887 -0.0277 -0.0280 -0.0981 -0.0889
[0.00277] [0.00278] [0.00454] [0.000876] [0.00110] [0.00715] [0.00741]
Income  10,000 -0.000554
[0.00216]
Ever on govt. assistance 0.201
[0.0434]
Mean, dept. var 3.117 3.117 3.117 0.204 0.467 3.209 3.209
Region FE? No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 23627 23627 23627 27975 31708 4066 4066
Notes: All regressions include year xed eects. The redistribution question asks individuals to place them-
selves on a ve-point scale on whether government should help the poor or individuals should fend for
themselves. \Increase welfare" is a binary variable indicating that welfare benets should increase. \Vote
Dem" is a binary variable indicating that you voted for the Democratic candidate in the most recent presiden-
tial election. To maximize sample size,\Ever receive gov. assistance" is based on two GSS questions. For most
observations, it is dened by the GSS variable GOV AID, based on the question: \Did you ever|because
of sickness, unemployment, or any other reason|receive anything like welfare, unemployment insurance, or
other aid from government agencies?" In 1986, the GSS specically asked if the respondent was ever on
welfare, and we combine this variable in our \government assistance" measure. In most cases, variation in
the number of observations is driven by variation in the number of respondents who answered the outcome
question. However, in the last two columns, we restrict the sample to having non-missing responses to both
the main redistribution question and our \ever receive assistance" variable. p < 0:1; p < 0:05; p < 0:01
35Figure I
Probability of being above last-place in ex-post distribution, by ex-ante rank (ex-ante
distribution is y1 = $1;:::y6 = $6)
Notes: In the rst series there is no income uncertainty, and thus the probability of being in last place
is one for the current last-place player and zero for others. The probabilities plotted in the second series
are generated as follows. We begin with the ex-ante income distribution y1 = $1;y2 = $2;::::y6 = $6. We
transform it into the ex-post distribution by adding an independently drawn i to each yi, where i  N(0;1).
After these six draws, the individuals are re-ranked based on the ex-post distribution. We repeat the process
10,000 times. The probability of being above last place in the ex-post distribution for each ex-ante rank was
averaged over the 10,000 repetitions.
36Figure II
Probability of choosing the lottery over the risk-free payment (one-shot games)
Notes: Based on fourteen six-player games of nine rounds each, for a total of 756 observations. Each round
every player was given the same choice between a two-outcome lottery and a risk-free payment of equivalent
expected value. See Section III.A. for details. All coecients and p-values are based on the probit regression:
choselotteryi =
P5
k=1 krankk
i +i; where rankk
i is an indicator variable for player i having rank k, standard
errors are clustered by player, and no other controls are included. As there are six ranks in the lottery
experiment, the excluded category is sixth (last) place. The p-values in the gure refer to the estimated xed
eect of being in rank k relative to the excluded category of last place. The y-axis values are the probit
coecients (as changes in probability) plus the mean of the excluded category (to normalize).
37Figure III
Probability of choosing the lottery over the risk-free payment when balances accumulate
Notes: Based on twelve six-player games of nine rounds each, for a total of 648 observations. Each round
every player was given the same choice between a two-outcome lottery and a risk-free payment of equivalent
expected value. See Section III.D. for details. All p-values are based on the probit regression: choselotteryi = P4
k=1 krankk
i + i; where rankk
i is an indicator variable for player i having rank k, standard errors are
clustered by player, and no other controls are included. As there are six ranks in the lottery experiment,
the excluded category is being in sixth (last) or fth place. The p-values in the gure refer to the estimated
xed eect of being in rank k relative to the excluded category of last or fth place. The y-axis values are
the probit coecients (as changes in probability) when choselottery is regressed on ranks one through ve
plus the mean for the last-place player (to normalize).
38Figure IV
Probability of choosing to give $2 to the lower-ranked player in their choice set
Notes: Based on seven six-player games of eight rounds each, giving a total of 336 observations. Each player
except the rst- and last-place player were given the choice between giving an extra $2 to the person directly
above or below them in the distribution. The rst-place player decided between the second- and third-place
player, while the last-place player decided between the fourth- and fth-place player. See Section IV.A. for
details. All p-values are based on the probit regression: gave to lower ranki =
P6
k6=5 krankk
i + i; where
rankk
i is an indicator variable for player i having rank k, standard errors are clustered by player, and no other
controls are included. As there are six ranks in this version of the redistribution experiment, the excluded
category is fth (second-to-last) place. The p-values in the gure refer to the estimated xed eect of being
in rank k relative to the excluded category of fth place. The y-axis values are the probit coecients (as
changes in probability) plus the mean of the excluded category (to normalize).
39Figure V
Probability of choosing to give $2 to the lower-ranked player in their choice set
(eight-player game)
Notes: Based on nine eight-player games of nine rounds each, giving a total of 648 observations. Each player
except the rst- and last-place player were given the choice between giving an extra $2 to the person directly
above or below them in the distribution. The rst-place player decided between the second- and third-place
player, while the last-place player decided between the sixth- and seventh-place player. See Section IV.D. for
details. All p-values are based on the probit regression: gave to lower ranki =
P8
k6=7 krankk
i + i; where
rankk
i is an indicator variable for player i having rank k, standard errors are clustered by player, and no
other controls are included. As there are eight ranks in this version of the redistribution experiment, the
excluded category is seventh (second-to-last) place. The p-values in the gure refer to the estimated xed
eect of being in rank k relative to the excluded category of seventh place. The y-axis values are the probit
coecients (as changes in probability) plus the mean of the excluded category (to normalize).
40Figure VI
Support for increasing the minimum wage from $7.25, by wage rate
Notes: Based on the authors' online survey of employed individuals ages 23 to 64. See Section V.B. for
details. The rst series displays the share of each wage group that supports increasing the minimum wage.
The second series plots the coecients (with p-values labeled) on the wage-category xed eects (omitted
category $7:25 > wage  $8:25) from a probit regression that also controls for gender, race, ethnicity,
educational level, party aliation, marital and parental status, approval rating of President Obama, and
union status.
41Figure VII
Support for redistribution over the income distribution
Notes: Based on data from the General Social Survey. This gure plots coecients from a regression of
Redistributionit =
P
n nIn
i + t + it, where In
i is an indicator variable for being in the nth income decile
(the top decile is the omitted category and thus has a coecient of zero) and t are year xed eects. Deciles
are based on adjusted household income (real household income divided by the square root of household
size). Redistribution is based on the GSS question helppoor, which asks individuals to put themselves on a
ve point scale (with the extremes being that \government should do everything it can to help the poor"
versus \people should fend for themselves").
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